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O ri g in a l A r ti c le

U n w o r k i n g Mi l t o n : S t e p s to a
georgics of the mind

S t e v e n S w ar b r i c k
Department of English, Brown University, Providence, RI.

Abstract Traditionally read as a poem about laboring subjects who gain power through
abstract and abstracting forms of bodily discipline, John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667,
1674) more compellingly foregrounds the erotics of the Garden as a space where humans
and nonhumans intra-act materially and sexually. Following Christopher Hill, who long
ago pointed to not one but two revolutions in the history of seventeenth-century English
radicalism – the ﬁrst, ‘the one which succeeded[,]… the protestant ethic’; and the second,
‘the revolution which never happened,’ which sought ‘communal property, a far wider
democracy[,] and rejected the protestant ethic’ – I show how Milton’s Paradise Lost gives
substance to ‘the revolution which never happened’ by imagining a commons, indeed a
communism, in which human beings are not at the center of things, but rather constitute one
part of the greater ecology of mind within Milton’s poem. In the space created by this ecological reimagining, plants assume a new agency. I call this reimagining ‘ecology to come.’
postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies (2016) 7, 120–146.
doi:10.1057/pmed.2013.40; published online 10 January 2014

Our knowledge, and the scale of nature set
From centre to circumference, whereon
In contemplation of created things
By steps we may ascend to God.
John Milton, Paradise Lost
This way of thinking I call the ‘ecology of mind,’ or the ecology of ideas. It is a
science which does not yet exist as an organized body of theory or knowledge.
Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960 postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies
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In his The Herball or Generall Historie of Plantes (1597), the English herbalist
John Gerard hastens to explain why plants ought to be considered preeminent
‘Among the manifold creatures of God’ (Gerard, 1597, 1). He reasons that of all
God’s creatures ‘that have all in all ages diversely entertained many excellent wits,
and drawen them to the contemplation of the diuine wisdome’,
none haue prouoked mens studies more, or satisﬁed their desires so much,
as plants have done, and that vpon iust and woorthie causes: For if delight
may prouoke mens labour, what greater delight is there than to behold the
earth apparelled with plants, as with a robe of imbroidered worke, set with
orient pearles, and garnished with great diuersitie of rare and costly iewels?
(Gerard, 1597, 1)
Gerard’s assessment of the Earth’s ﬂoral estate is striking not only for the
immediate reason that he privileges plants ‘among the manifold creatures of
God,’ including humans, but also because, in addition to naming the ‘use’ and
‘necessitie’ of plants, which since ‘the ﬁrst ages of the world … have continued ever
since of necessarie use both for meates to maintaine life, and for medicine to
recover health,’ Gerard also speciﬁes the ‘principall’ measure of plants as their
ability to affect ‘delight,’ both in ‘the outward senses’ and ‘in the minde’ (Gerard,
1597, 1). Indeed, Gerard goes so far as to say that the affect of ‘delight’ elicited by
plants is not only congenial to the mind, but may be a necessary provocation to
‘wisdome,’ ‘contemplation’ and the ‘satisfaction’ of our ‘desires.’ Gerard’s ascription of a propaedeutic efﬁcacy to plants hinges, seemingly without contradiction,
on the latter’s ability to cultivate the higher faculties of the mind through an
involutionary address to the senses. Plants, according to Gerard, ‘pro-voke,’
meaning that they call forth, challenge, arouse, stir up, excite and appeal (the
Latin etymology of vocare means literally ‘to call’). This address turns the mind
inside out, making it ﬂush with the body’s sensitive exterior. How do plants
perform this involutionary vocation? By appearing before the eye, ‘apparelled …
as with a robe of imbroidered worke,’ rhetorically emblazoned in accordance with
the Petrarchan genre’s signature combination of visual fragmentation and lush
adornment, plants act in Gerard’s description as lures to thought, or to what
Timothy Morton calls, ‘the ecological thought.’ As Morton writes:
The ecological thought is thought about ecology, but it’s also a thinking that
is ecological …. The ecological thought doesn’t just occur ‘in the mind.’ It’s
a practice and a process of becoming fully aware of how human beings are
connected with other beings – animal, vegetable, or mineral. Ultimately, this
includes thinking about democracy.
(Morton, 2010, 7)1
I begin with Gerard’s Herball not because it takes an interest in looking at
plants (though that is part of it), but because it forces us to consider how plants
invite us to look differently, to see more, that is, and in turn to feel more than we
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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modernity, he
makes an
exception in the
case of Milton,
writing: ‘Milton
achieves the
ecological thought
in form as well
as in content’
(Morton, 2010,
23).
2 For an account
that traces the
authorship and
print production
of Gerard’s
Herball within
the context of a
‘European
Republic of
Letters,’ see
Harkness (2007).

are used to.2 Today, we are accustomed to thinking of terms such as ‘wisdome’
and ‘contemplation’ (to use Gerard’s terms) with respect to the higher faculties
of cognition (that is, ‘the mind’). Yet rarely do we associate these terms with
affective response, much less with other creatures: animal, vegetable or mineral.
What once appeared obvious to Gerard and to the naturalists of his time as a
practice that veered unimpeachably upon the strange and unpredictable nature
of their life’s work, namely, the cultivation of mind through the nurturing of
plants, today seems odd. Yet more and more in the twenty-ﬁrst century we
humans increasingly ﬁnd ourselves in daily encounter with nonhuman species
who are challenging our claims to sovereignty over the Earth’s physical and
mental resources (Smith, 2009). More and more we ﬁnd ourselves confronted
with different scales of life and different modes of living, of which we are deeply,
inextricably, intertwined. Today, in an era of biopolitics, in which the question
of how and where to value life is precisely what is at stake in debates over ‘bare
life’ and the growing threats of extinction, biologists and philosophers of life are
asking again and again ‘What is life?,’ or, as Helmreich has recently posed the
question, ‘What was life?’ (Helmreich, 2011, 676). From proliferating reproductive technologies to genomic experimentation, digital simulation and
informatic representation, ‘life’ is everywhere in question, but nowhere the
same (Thacker, 2010). At the level of the global ecosystem, we are learning
that the history of human affairs is deeply entangled with natural history; the
history of ‘life’ – hitherto understood as the history of human life – is coming
undone in the face of new and previously unimaginable historical agents:
global pandemics, natural disasters, mass extinction of species (Chakrabarty,
2009). Although the contemporary crisis of the Earth’s global ecosystem
makes this entanglement all the more precarious, it is does not therefore make
it vivid. The difﬁculty of perceiving entanglement is that it implies scaling
down human perception; no longer the measure of all things, humans are
obliged to perceive life at all levels, from the molecular to the global. Difﬁcult
though this may be, Doyle points out that this kind of scalar perception is
precisely what is needed:
Across the life and climate sciences, the news is this: You are deeply
implicated in the global ecosystem in ways scientiﬁc and technical practices
are only beginning to comprehend and model. If the breakthroughs in
medical and global imaging systems have provided us with revelations, they
reveal that our separateness from ecosystems is itself an illusion, and that we
are membranes inseparable from a global ecology.
(Doyle, 2010, 7)
How can we begin to adjust our scales of perception to apprehend our
entanglement with the Earth’s ecosystems? And what new models for thinking
and perceiving entanglement might we derive from Gerard’s description of
plants?
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In what follows, I argue that plants provide an uncanny way of re-calibrating
our mental architecture. As imaging systems in their own right, plants serve as
unique, evolutionarily adapted technologies for training human perception
to visualize life’s many entanglements. Like the posthuman ﬁgures that
Donna Haraway has theorized, from the ﬂeshly silicon of the ‘cyborg’ to the
human–animal symbiosis of ‘companion species’ (Haraway, 2008, 4–19).
I argue that plants, too, act as cybernetic pedagogues with the capacity to
seduce the mind’s eye toward more worldly modes of perception. Although the
concept of ‘seduction’ has held a prestigious place in the history of psychoanalysis, it was Charles Darwin, not Freud, who ﬁrst articulated the role of
seduction in the dynamic processes of nature. Whereas natural selection
provides a utilitarian understanding of evolution, one in which nature, bent
on survival, fundamentally aims to match the organism to its environment, it
was Darwin’s theory of sexual selection that introduced a disturbance in the
natural selective order. As Grosz explains:
In afﬁrming the radical distinction between natural and sexual selection –
that is, between skills and qualities that enable survival, and those that
enable courtship and pleasure, which sometimes overlap but commonly do
not – Darwin introduced an excessiveness into the development and
transformation of species. Species are no longer natural collections or kinds
developed to survive and compete, they are also the a posteriori and
ultimately incalculable consequences of sexual taste, appeal, or attraction.
(Grosz, 2008, 33)
What is more, because sexual selection does not serve the reproductive ends of
survival, it uses forms of seduction to elicit novel forms of attention. Elaine Scarry
has written beautifully about the evocative powers of plants in training the mind’s
eye toward diverse forms of perception. Although as humans we often see
ourselves as sole arbitrators over the worlds of meaning and perception, Scarry
argues that human perceptual capacities have been fundamentally shaped by our
evolutionary entanglement with plants. In the case of ﬂowers, this evolutionary
shaping most resembles a game of courtship.
Flowers can be taken as the representative of the imagination because of the
ease of imagining them. That ease is in turn attributable to their size and
the size of our heads, their shape and the shape of our eyes, their intense
localization and the radius of our compositional powers, their rarity that
lets them rise and enter our brains and our willingness to receive them as the
template for the production of other, more resistant compositions. It is
clear: we were made for one another. No wonder the kind of cross-species
desire that Ovid recommends turns out to be key to imaginative life, to the
bringing forth of what is fresh.
(Scarry, 2001, 65)
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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3 Foucault (2005,
16) enjoins labor
(askesis) and eros
as ‘the two major
forms in Western
spirituality for
conceptualizing
the modalities by
which the subject
must be
transformed in
order ﬁnally to
become capable of
truth.’ For a
related account of
spiritual askesis
that centers on
early modern
lyric, see Martz
(1954).

In this essay, I pursue the kind of cross-species desire that Darwin and Scarry
sketch out here. I do so by focusing on two motifs central to both the writings of
John Milton and the history of sexuality. Those motifs are, following Foucault,
labor and eros.3
Consider the laboring that takes place, contra Christian orthodoxy, in the
Garden of Paradise Lost ([1667] 2008), among the tendrils and branches and the
seductively overgrown ﬂora, which, despite the absence of physical need or the
ever renewed efforts of the ﬁrst man and woman to curb their excessive growth,
continue to exude themselves, in Milton’s words, by ‘Tending to wild’ (9.212). In
an evocative passage taken from Book 5 of Paradise Lost, we witness a scene of
erotic labor that turns on this very language of plants tending to wild. In it, ‘rural
work’ registers as a deeply seductive ecology:
On to their morning’s rural work they [Adam and Eve] haste
Among sweet dews and ﬂowers; where any row
Of fruit trees over-woody reached too far
Their pampered boughs, and needed hands to check
Fruitless embraces.
(5.211–215)
Here, the poetics of laboring inaugurated by Virgil’s Georgics cross-cuts with
Milton’s epic, producing a scene of ‘rural work’ in which ‘trees over-woody’
outstrip the efforts of the ﬁrst workers ‘to check’ their wild growth. In this
Sisyphean venture, ‘work’ tends to unwork as plants overreach man’s labors.
What interests me, however, is not the futility of Adam and Eve’s work but
rather the cross-species desire that such work enables. Continuing from the
last line:
they led the vine
To wed her elm; she spoused about him twines
Her marriageable arms, and with her brings
Her dower the adopted clusters, to adorn
his barren leaves.
(5.215–219)

4 For an account of
‘the indistinct
human’ as an
internal condition
of Renaissance
humanism, see
Feerick and
Nardizzi (2012,
1–12).
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The entanglement of ‘vine’ and ‘elm’ doubles as human and nonhuman desires
intertwine around the confusion of pronouns (‘they,’ ‘her,’ ‘she’). Is the vine a
‘she’? Is the ‘she’ that ‘twines’ Eve? Milton’s poem is replete with such moments in
which ‘rural work’ combines with ecological forces to unwork the Garden’s
‘human’ center.4 In the following passage, Adam’s call to ‘labour’ is again undone
by this wild ecology:
And at our pleasant labour, to reform
Yon ﬂowery arbours, yonder alleys green,
Our walk at noon, with branches overgrown,

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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That mock our scant manuring, and require
More hands than ours to lop their wanton growth.
(4.627–629)
In good Puritan fashion, Milton’s Adam equates ‘pleasant labour’ with the desire
to ‘reform’ the Garden. But no sooner does he express this desire when his labors
are undercut (the reﬂexive obverse of ‘to lop’). The hard dual syllabic, ‘More
hands,’ unworks Adam’s reformist ambitions in the face of ‘overgrown’ plants
and ‘wanton growth.’ A haunting refrain that repeats throughout Milton’s poem
(for instance, it appears in my ﬁrst quotation, ‘needed hands’), ‘More hands’
signals an interruptive force internal to the Garden. It is not that ‘pleasant labor’
results in nothing; rather, it is that Adam and Eve’s labors reveal an excess that is
both inhuman and unworkable.
By focusing on this ‘wanton’ ﬂora and on the cross-species desires engendered
by the Garden, my goal is to show that instead of simply producing laboring
subjects as the embodiments of a Puritan mentality5 or an emergent public
sphere,6 Milton’s vision of the Garden testiﬁes to a form of life that is not
dependent on the separation of subjects from objects (Burckhardt, 1958; Grazia
et al, 1996) or on the decathexis of work from desire (Picciotto, 2005). Rather,
subjects and objects, humans, animals and plants, unwork their ﬁxed identities
through their erotic entanglements. In this way, ‘rural work’ enjoins my title:
‘Unworking Milton.’7 In the space created by this ecological reimagining, plants
assume a new agency, something akin to what Bennett terms a ‘vital materiality’:
the recognition that ‘vitality is shared by all things,’ and not limited to humans
alone (Bennett, 2010, 89).8
While Miltonists have long pointed to the fact that Milton revises the Genesis
story by ﬁguring Adam and Eve as laborers whose divine charge is to put off
carnal temptation through physical exertion and cultivation of the Garden, a task
traditionally reserved for fallen man, too often readers of Milton desist at the
point of determining the full signiﬁcance of this revision. Consequently, what is
unconventional in Milton has now become rote among Milton critics: the fact
that Adam and Eve must cultivate the Garden is read as a commonplace of
Milton’s Puritanism. My reading of Paradise Lost resists this assumption. Indeed,
it shows that we err in reducing Milton’s poetic (re)vision to either a theological
exercise (Fish, 1998, 2001), on the one hand, or a protestant work ethic
(Lewalski, 1979), on the other. We err insofar as we miss seeing the queer
potentiality, or the sheer erotic excess, of Milton’s vision of the Garden, which is
not merely about work, after all, but about unworking our assumptions about
collectivity, agency, sexuality and the commons.9 I call this form of unworking
and the assemblage of human and nonhuman forces that it enlists an ecology.
Though it can also be read, after Foucault, as a form of askesis.
Writing in his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault reﬂects on a matter of
intrinsic importance to Milton’s ecopoetics. Following Kant, he describes what he
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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5 For a compelling
argument against
reading Milton as
a ‘Puritan poet,’
see Martin (2010).

6 As Kuzner argues
(Kuzner, 2009,
106), critics who
read Milton in
light of
Habermasian
public sphere
theory (see, for
example,
Norbrook, 1999)
tend to neglect
that Milton
intertwines
‘ostensibly public
and ostensibly
private spaces and
behaviors …
whose separation
permits
Habermasian
forms of modern,
public selfhood to
emerge.’
7 By ‘Unworking
Milton’ I refer to
Jean-Luc Nancy’s
idea of ‘the
community of
unworking.’ See
Nancy (1991).
8 Drawing on a
tradition of preand early modern
vitalist thinkers
including
Epicurus,
Lucretius, Thomas
Hobbes and
Baruch Spinoza,
Bennett (2010, 62)
posits a ‘vital
materialism’ that
is neither naive
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(governed by a
spiritual force)
nor mechanistic.
Although not a
focus of her study,
this conception of
vitalist agency
bears a striking
resemblance to
the seventeenthcentury ‘vitalist
moment’ detailed
by Rogers (1996,
8–9), in which
‘the ﬁgure of
autonomous
material agency’
provided a range
of political
radicals, including
John Milton, with
theoretical
alternatives to
both Calvinist and
mechanist forms
of determinism.
9 This ecological
approach departs
from the placebased and
phenomenological
ecocriticism of
critics such as
Hiltner (2003)
and instead aims
at the uncanny or
out-of-place
(unheimlich)
nature of Milton’s
oikos. For a
trenchant critique
of place-based
ecology, see Heise
(2008).
10 For an account of
the explosive
atemporal power
of the ‘now’ in
medieval and
postmodern
timeframes, see
Dinshaw (2012).
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calls ‘the discreet entrance into the history of thought of a question that modern
philosophy has not been capable of answering,’ namely, Was ist Aufklärung?
(What is Enlightenment?), and asks: ‘What, then, is this event that is called the
Aufklärung and that has determined, at least in part, what we are, what we think,
and what we do today?’ (Foucault, 1997b, 303). The emphasis on ‘today’ is not
inconsequential. For as Foucault goes on, he notes that Kant does not deﬁne
Enlightenment as an accomplished fact or as ‘a historical process.’ Instead, Kant
refracts the history of modernity from the perspective ‘of contemporary reality
alone,’ asking, in Foucault’s words, ‘What difference does today introduce with
respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault, 1997b, 305). What is Enlightenment now, in other
words? As a precursor to what Foucault will later term ‘care of the self,’ that
ongoing process of desubjectivization and experimentation that inhabits modes of
quotidian existence, self-practice, corporeal comportment, living and dying, Kant’s
‘attitude’ to modernity ushers in a different way of relating to history as the history
of the present. This way of relating that involves forms of askesis, that is, practices
of the self in the transformation of thought, will be the framework with which I
proceed in this essay as we encounter attitudes and practices akin to those that
Foucault labels under ‘Enlightenment.’ From poetic labor to eating to practices of
sexual assemblage, Milton’s georgics, like Foucault’s Aufklärung, gravitates toward
the time of the now, but a now that explodes time from any strict teleological or
instrumental development.10 Milton’s ‘georgics of the mind’ (a phrase I borrow
from Bacon [see Bacon, [1605] 2002, 245]) torques time toward an ecology to
come.11 Tracing that untimely ecology will be the work of this essay.12

H o w So o n H a th T i m e ?
Allow me to begin with a short poem, Milton’s ‘Sonnet 7.’ Although critics often
read ‘Sonnet 7’ as a statement about poetic immaturity,13 the poem works rather
to undo developmental chronologies by ﬁguring poetic life, and indeed life in
general, as a labor of temporal multiplicity. Here is Milton:
How soon hath time the subtle thief of youth,
Stol’n on his wing my three and twentieth year!
My hasting days ﬂy on with full career,
But my late spring no bud or blossom shew’th.
Perhaps my semblance might deceive the truth,
That I to manhood am arrived so near,
And inward ripeness doth much less appear,
That some more timely-happy spirits endueth.
Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow,
It shall be still in strictest measure even,
To that same lot, however mean or high,

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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Toward which time leads me, and the will of heaven;
All is, if I have grace to use it so,
As ever in my great task-master’s eye.
(Milton, [1645] 2008, 34–35)

11 On the Derridian
inﬂection of
‘ecology to come,’
see Morton (2007,
6).

‘Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow’: Milton’s poem, published among his
1645 poems, is an experiment in the anachronic time of becoming (Nagel and
Wood, 2010). It is nothing if not untimely. From the opening quatrain, indeed,
the opening line, time is set off center. ‘How soon,’ says the speaker, already
intoning the lesson (his and ours) that time in Milton’s poetic universe is neither a
series of discrete nows nor a linear succession. Time is process; it is composing
and decomposing. ‘How soon hath time’ – time has already happened. In
Milton’s cosmos, time lags precisely as it moves forward. Already ‘Stol’n,’ ‘youth’
reappears after ‘hasting days’ only to appear too early, too late: ‘my late spring no
bud or blossom shew’th.’ In the following quatrain, while there is an appearance
of growth, what ‘shew’th’ is not ‘the truth’ of ‘manhood’ or ‘inward ripeness,’ but
their ﬂeeting ‘semblance.’ A semblance does not register depth, only surface. The
speaker’s ‘semblance’ refracts time as it ‘deceives the truth.’ Behind it are only
more semblances.
I want to pause here to reﬂect on the nature of these semblances. We should
recall that semblances are more than just surfaces; semblances are gatherings:
they simulate (sembler) as they as-semble.
Writing on the notion of assemblage in early modern historiography, Jonathan
Gil Harris suggests that material objects oblige us to think history in terms of the
anachronic, that is, in terms of the differential timelines that fold and unfold in
the object, any object whatsoever (Harris, 2009). For Harris, time is always the
inhuman time of the baroque fold; it has inﬁnite points of contact, and inﬁnite
gradations of speed and slowness. Time is, he suggests, inhuman precisely
because it inheres in objects and at scales unimaginable to human comprehension.
Quoting Bruno Latour, Harris observes that ‘I may use an electric drill, but I
also use a hammer. The former is thirty-ﬁve years old, the latter hundreds of
thousands …. Some of my genes are 500 million years old, others 3 million,
others 100,000 years old, and my habits range in age from a few days to several
thousand years’ (Harris, 2009, 3).
Not unlike Latour’s hammer, Milton’s poem partakes of this inhuman time by
imagining itself at multiple speeds and multiple scales of becoming: from youth to
maturity; ripeness to decay; and last, eternity. Milton’s poem is a happening. In
point of fact, it is about being in the midst of a happening. But this happening is
and is not the speaker’s. Although the speaker’s temporal attitude is fastened to
an image of nature, here ﬁgured as ‘my late spring,’ this nature is, as we soon
learn, not one: nature is not natural. As vehicle, ‘spring’ connotes the cyclical time
of growth and fertility; as tenor, poetic maturity. But the speaker’s image of ‘late
spring’ tends ﬁnally to infertility (no bud or blossom shew’th), despite his future
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960
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12 Given my
emphasis on life
practices of the
self, this essay
could very well
have been titled
‘Steps to a
Pastoral of the
Mind.’ I persist
in the generic
attribute of
georgic so as to
avoid the too easy
relegation of all
that is pleasurable
to the side of
pastoral, while
leaving untainted
all that concerns
physical
moderation to the
side of labor.
13 In their
‘Introduction’ to
Milton’s Major
Works ([1645]
[1667] 2008, xv),
Goldberg and
Orgel write that in
the revolutionary
times of the 1630s
and 1640s, ‘to
take charge of
circumstances that
were not always in
his control,
Milton described
himself as both
feeling and
appearing
younger than he
really was.’
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hope ‘That some more timely-happy spirits’ may ‘endueth.’ In this way, the
promise of a certain futurity that would develop from and be continuous with
the past is left suspended: neither ﬁnished nor unﬁnished, the poem radiates from
the middle – like a plant – producing differences, surprises and uncanny emergences
through its temporal unfolding.
‘Sonnet 7’ calls to mind the sense of activity and immediacy that Whitehead
(1938) and, more recently, Massumi (2011) have termed ‘process philosophy.’
Following Whitehead, Massumi re-conceives of ‘life’ as a generalized process of
becoming or ‘emergence.’ ‘The world is not a grab-bag of things,’ Massumi
writes, ‘It’s always in germ. To perceive the world in an object frame is to neglect
the wider range of its germinal reality’ (Massumi, 2011, 6). In an uncanny way,
process and emergence come to represent core concepts in both the vitalist
philosophies of Whitehead and Massumi and, in a less explicit sense, Milton’s
poetry. Teskey avers to the ‘patterns of emergence’ that ‘tend to appear at crucial
moments in Milton’s poetry,’ writing: ‘It is the persisting and undeniable sense we
have that the poem is an emergent structure, something that feels, even as we read
it, still in the process of being created, of excitedly breaking forth from the poet’s
imagination and passing, even now, through the poet’s lips to our ears’ (Teskey,
2006, 17–19). From this sense of untimely passing, it is hard not to detect the
emergence of another, transhistorical folding – Milton’s ‘less or more’ – in folded
touch with this statement by Whitehead:
[T]he notion of existence involves the notion of an environment of
existences and of types of existences. Any one instance of existence involves
the notion of other existences, connected with it and yet beyond it. This
notion of the environment introduces the notion of ‘more and less,’ and of
multiplicity.
(Whitehead, 1938, 6–7)
For Whitehead, the notion of ‘more and less’ emerges from the ‘recognition of the
goings-on of nature in which we, and all things of all types, are immersed. It has
its origin in the thought of ourselves as process immersed in process beyond
ourselves’ (Whitehead, 1938, 8). Contrary to the positivist belief in pure
objectivity, Whitehead claims that ‘connectedness is of the essence of all things
of all types,’ and that to abstract from connectedness – that is, to see only
positivities – ‘involves the omission of an essential factor in the fact considered’
(Whitehead, 1938, 9). In short, ‘No fact is merely itself.’ To look from the vantage
of ‘process’ is to perceive inﬁnite gradations of ‘connectedness’ in and between the
bare ‘facts’ of life. It is to see life in terms of ‘more and less,’ composition and
de-composition, rather than in terms of either/or, presence or absence. Whitehead
suggests that so entangled are the perceiver and the perceivable world ‘that in
every consideration of a single fact there is the suppressed presupposition of the
environmental …. This environment, thus coordinated, is the whole universe in
its perspective to the fact’ (Whitehead, 1938, 9). Echoing what anthropologist
128

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960

postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies

Vol. 7, 1, 120–146

Unworking Milton

and early cyberneticist Gregory Bateson once called ‘steps to an ecology of mind,’
Whitehead maintains that a truly ecological perspective is one that is always
willingly outstripped by the scale and complexity of ecological entanglement.
‘Any one instance of existence involves the notion of other existences, connected
with it and yet beyond it (Whitehead, 1938, 7)’. This ‘beyond’ implies a limit to
what we can know about the environment, and implicatively, about ourselves.
Hence the need to approach the environment by ‘steps.’
And Milton? The notion of ‘less or more, or soon or slow’ in Milton’s poem
invites us to think along the lines of what Gilles Deleuze describes as a life of
immanence. The term immanence refers to things which are massively intraconnected (Barad, 2007, 376–384), neither subject nor object, but web. For
Deleuze, ‘immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not
depend on an object or belong to a subject’ (Deleuze, 2001, 26). Immanence, says
Deleuze, is ‘a life.’ In Milton’s poem, ‘a life’ translates ‘in strictest measure even’ to
the ﬁnal couplet’s opening two syllables: ‘All is.’ While the previous line, ‘Toward
which time leaves me,’ gives the poem a teleological (not to mention theological)
bent, one which arcs toward ‘heaven’ and the all-seeing ‘eye’ of God, I am more
concerned here with the perspective that the ‘All is’ engenders for approaching the
notion of ‘life.’ In the immanent ﬁeld that is ‘Sonnet 7,’ one of the ﬁgures that
emerges is the ﬁgure of plant life, a ﬁgure that pushes the poem heliotropically, as it
were, from ‘late spring’ to ‘inward ripeness’ to the poem’s sublime conclusion.
Although nothing is more common among Renaissance ﬁgures than that of a
plant or ﬂower, ubiquitous for their poetic tropes – laurel and poesy – this
particular ﬁgure stands out as one that will re-emerge much later in Milton’s
poetic process as ‘care of the self’ and care of the land intersect in scenes of eating.
It is to that untimely ﬁgure that I turn to next.

E at i n g We l l
In Book 5 of Paradise Lost, Milton invites the reader to perceive the created
universe as an alimentary one.14 Pausing over a discussion between the ﬁrst man,
Adam, and his guest, the angel Raphael, a discussion that circles around (of all
things) the subject of ‘food,’ Milton dilates his poem to make ‘nourishment’ the
governing principle of ‘whatever was created’ (5.414, 421). From embodied man
to ‘purest spirits,’
… both contain,
Within them every lower faculty
Of sense, whereby they hear, see, smell, touch, taste,
Tasting concoct, digest, assimilate,
And corporeal to incorporeal turn.

14 For an extended
treatment of
Milton’s
alimentary
poetics, see
Schoenfeldt
(2000).

(5.409–413)
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960

postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies

Vol. 7, 1, 120–146

129

Swarbrick

Goldberg, writing on the philosophical materialism of Lucretius, points out that
in Milton’s monist universe ‘digestion is the route to oneness’ (Goldberg, 2009,
193). In this sense eating is parallel to sex (the other subject of Adam and
Raphael’s discussion), which, according to Raphael, ‘Leads up to heaven, is both
the way and guide’ (8.613). Alighting on the notion of the ‘incorporeal’ as it
appears in both Milton and Foucault, Goldberg suggests that it is the very
‘perversion’ of substance, substance turning into ‘simulacra’ without depth or
direction, that constitutes the (de)foundational nature of Milton’s (and Foucault’s) monist universe. ‘It is the nature of things that they are not solid bodies
but rather bodies in motion; between things, connecting and separating them,
are the simulacra they cast off’ (Goldberg, 2009, 33). What remains to be said,
however, is that as Milton’s poem continues, the way things are connected and
‘cast off’ is entirely ‘alimental.’ From the smallest scale of Milton’s universe to the
largest, eating is not simply what one does; it is of the very nature of things:
For know, whatever was created, needs
To be sustained and fed; of elements
The grosser feeds the purer, earth the sea,
Earth and the sea feed air, the air those ﬁres
Ethereal, and as lowest ﬁrst the moon;
………………
Nor doth the moon no nourishment exhale
From her moist continent to higher orbs.
The sun that light imparts to all, receives
from all his alimental recompense
In humid exhalations, and at even
Sups with the ocean.
(5.414–426)
In these lines, Milton’s early invocation of ‘less or more’ ﬁnds its echo in the vast
concatenation of a universe strung together by little more than the material
necessity of eating and (this is implied) shitting. Such is the ‘nourishmment’ by
which, as Raphael will later say, ‘All things proceed …/… one ﬁrst matter all,/
Indued with various forms, various degrees/Of substance, and in things that live,
of life’ (5.470–474). What’s striking, however, is less the alimentary nature of
Milton’s cosmology and more the form it resembles. Recall that in one of the
earliest attempts to think the ontology of ‘life,’ Aristotle’s De anima, Aristotle
partitions ‘life itself’ into three separate forms (plants, animals, humans) according to the type of ‘life’ that is manifested in them (Aristotle, 1984). Humans alone
are accorded the power of thinking, animals the power of movement and
sensation, whereas plants are deemed ‘living’ only in the sense that they decay
and grow. Aristotle identiﬁes this form of life common to plants ‘nutritive life’: ‘it
is the only psychic potentiality they possess’ (quoted in Agamben, 2004, 14).
Commenting on this division in the ontology of life, Agamben has noted that ‘the
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isolation of nutritive life (which the ancient commentators will already call
vegetative) constitutes in every sense a fundamental event for Western science,’
for ‘it was primarily by means of a progressive generalization and redeﬁnition of
the concept of vegetative life (now coinciding with the biological heritage of the
nation) that the State would carry out its new vocation’ (Agamben, 2004, 14, 15).
The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal
and human, therefore passes ﬁrst of all as a mobile border within living
man, and without this intimate caesura the very decision of what is human
and what is not would probably not be possible.
(Agamben, 2004, 15)
Milton’s poem enacts this ‘mobile border’ at all scales of existence, only to
confound it. Cutting across Aristotle’s tripartite ontology, ‘life’ proper becomes
synonymous with vegetative life; humans and animals co-mingle; and at the
center of this entangled universe, Milton foregrounds the vital movements of
nourishment and decay. In Milton’s vitalist universe, ﬂesh and spirit share the
same root:
… So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
More airy, last the bright consummate ﬂower
Spirits odorous breathes: ﬂowers and their fruit
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,
To intellectual, give both life and sense,
Fancy and understanding, whence the soul
Reason receives,…………
………………
Differing but in degree, of kind the same.
(5.479–490)
From the view offered by these few words, ‘Differing but in degree,’ we begin to
perceive how Milton’s theory of life works – or rather unworks. Stanley Fish has
argued that to understand how Milton works, one should look to Freud.
Beginning with the Freudian death drive, that inexhaustible machine of repetition, Fish maps the story of the fall onto the story of life’s emergence. Drawing on
Freud’s theory that all living matter emerges from and desires return to rest and
stasis, Fish recasts the Freudian death drive in a distinctly Christian light:
[W]e must leave the analogy with Freud behind, because for Milton the
issues at stake are theological ones and the circuitous paths are the vehicles
either of redemption or damnation. Where a path leads to depends on
whether those who are on it believe that they are striking out in new and
adventurous directions … or whether … they are trying to get back home
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960

postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies

Vol. 7, 1, 120–146

131

Swarbrick

…. Those who seek to ﬁnd rest in service to the deity act independently in
the hope that they may one day cease to do so because their labors and their
voices will have been reabsorbed into the rhythms and harmony of eternity.
(Fish, 2001, 3)
Here, the terms labor, motion, sound and rhythm are repurposed by Fish to reach
after the Platonic ideals of ‘harmony’ and eternal form. By extension, Fish renders
Milton’s poetry (labor, motion, sound, rhythm) as an art whose ‘aim,’ like ‘the
aim of life,’ is stillness, quiescence, death. Poetry is linked to spirit, a spiritual form
achieved only by extinguishing life and poetic vitality. The materialism that Fish
borrows from Freud is in turn linked to poetic deviation ‘aimed at getting back in
tune with heaven’ (Fish, 2001, 4). Out of tune, the rhythms of life are thus directed
toward death, but a death that is, oddly enough, truer than life itself: ‘It is in this sense
that the aim of life, rightly lived, is death’ (Fish, 2001, 4). For Fish, the force of life’s
essential dynamism points to a deviation, a lapse, and so mirrors the psychological
deviations of Milton’s Satan. In Fish’s programmatic words, ‘the direction of
knowledge’ in Milton’s poetry ‘is from the inside out …. Rather than conﬁrming or
disconﬁrming belief, the external landscape, in all its details, will be a function
of belief’ (Fish, 2001, 23–24). And again: ‘afﬁrming God is not something you do on
the basis of evidence [in Milton’s poetry]; it is something you do against the evidence
provided by forms of life considered apart from his creative and sustaining power,
forms of life that appear real and compelling in their attraction but that are ﬁnally
(and always) unreal and therefore without any claims on us at all’ (Fish, 2001, 10).
What follows from Fish’s retooling of Freud is an interlocking series of
binaries: inside/outside, belief/fact, center/deviation, stasis/movement, man/nature, mind/materiality, life/death. Although Fish qualiﬁes his appropriation of
Freud (‘All we need do is substitute for Freud’s organist vocabulary the
vocabulary of creation, sin, redemption, and reunion’ [Fish, 2001, 2]), he does
not escape the latter’s conception of matter as tending toward lifelessness or
homeostasis. For Fish, Milton ‘works’ precisely insofar as matter in his poem does
not – insofar as it is rendered lifeless and inert, ‘without any claims on us at all’
(Fish, 2001, 10). Fish’s reading produces a monoculture in which there is only
fallen nature, and death. A more astute reading, Joanna Picciotto’s, notes that for
Milton there is no ‘rigid boundary between two states of being whose incommensurability provides the mechanism for readerly self-correction …. Milton’s
famous dips into fallen language when describing Eden are just what they seem
to be: efforts to disrupt an at once naive and corrupt understanding of innocence
as a reassuringly lost state of perfection’ (Picciotto, 2010, 403).
On the other hand, what makes Freud’s account so gratifying is his paradoxical
claim that internal to the reproductive logic of the organism is a machine of
regressive a-futurity. The words ‘rest’ and ‘stasis’ mark not only life’s beginning
but also life’s end. Thus the problem with beginnings: that the reproductive logic
of life – what Freud calls ‘pleasure’ – is already outstripped by its opposite – the
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machine of death. Freud’s ‘earlier state of things’ is as much proleptic as it is
analeptic, both prospective and retrospective at once; for his view of ‘life’ is
essentially anachronistic insofar as the organism itself is torn between separation
and return, time and no time, movement and death. ‘Life’ vexes the living
organism and redirects it to beginnings that are already endings.
A Miltonic test case for this vexatious temporality appears in Book 11, after the
Fall: there, the Angel Michael marks the temporal rupture between pre- and
postlapsarian life by invoking the ‘original crime’ (11.424), that of eating the
forbidden fruit, and cuts to a future scene in which Adam and Eve’s offspring, Cain
and Abel, offer up the fruits of their labors to feed a carnivorous God. In this scene,
the trauma of the ﬁrst crime doubles and repeats: Cain and Abel, cursed to labor for
their parents’ sins, offer up not one sacriﬁce, but two: ﬁrst, a vegetable sacriﬁce:
A sweaty reaper from his tillage brought
First fruits,
(11.434–435)
and second, an animal sacriﬁce,
a shepherd next
More meek came with the ﬁrstlings of his ﬂock
Choicest and best; then sacriﬁcing, laid
the innards and their fat, with incense strewed.
(11.436–439)
If what makes prelapsarian life Edenic is the absence of death – or in this case,
animal sacriﬁce – what makes Book 11 so intriguing is that it militates against
the notion of an ‘original crime’ by collapsing past, present and future into a
scene of traumatic repetition. From the vantage of the future anterior, Adam
witnesses his own crime doubled by the sacriﬁce of ‘First fruits.’ In Christian
typology, this future anterior doubling looks both ahead to Christ’s sacriﬁce on the
cross and backwards again in time to Christ’s circumcision, as is recounted in
Richard Crashaw’s devotional lyric, ‘Our Lord in his Circumcision’: ‘To thee these
ﬁrst fruits of my growing death/(For what else is my life?) lo I bequeath’ (Crashaw,
[1646] 1974, 1–2). In the lines above, not only are we confronted with an image of
‘what is to come’ (12.11), but included in this image is a new relation to eating.
Milton’s God becomes quite literally a God of visual consumption:
His [Abel’s] offering soon propitious ﬁre from heaven
Consumed with nimble glance, and grateful steam.
(11.441–442)
God’s eye devours. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida asks: ‘Might
sovereignty be devouring? Might its force, its power, … its absolute potency’ to
exteriorize and to kill ‘be, in essence and always in the last instance, a power of
devourment …?’ (Derrida, 2009, 23). While Milton’s postlapsarian vision seems
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to answer this question in the afﬁrmative, positing both God and man as
sovereigns because they have the right to kill and eat animals, he does not simply
adhere (pace Stanley Fish) to a strict timeline of before and after. Put differently: if
what makes prelapsarian life Edenic is the absence of animal death, what about
plants? Remembering that the ﬁrst sacriﬁce to take place ‘after’ the Fall involves
plant life, or ‘First fruits,’ I would like to suggest that one of the ways Milton ‘dips
into fallen language’ in his poem is through the eating, sharing, cultivation and
calculation of plant life and death. The question posed to the reader, then, is not
whether or not to renounce death (Fish’s question) but rather how to live with
death. As Derrida says, it would be a question of how to eat well (see Derrida,
1995). Unworking Milton entails grappling with the calculations of plant life and
death from (and in) the beginning.

A l l A bo u t E ve
To delight of human sense exposed
In narrow room nature’s whole wealth, yea more,
A heaven on earth, for blissful Paradise
Of God the garden was, by him in the east
Of Eden was planted.
(4.206–210)
Paradise Lost begins with a question: ‘what cause/Moved our grand parents in
that happy state,/… to fall off/From their creator …?/Who ﬁrst seduced them to
that foul revolt?’ (1.28–33). Leaving aside the obvious answer – that Satan was
the ‘cause’ of that ‘foul revolt’ – I would like to point out that some of the more
complex ﬁgurations of seduction that occur in Milton’s poem take place not with
Satan, but among a wider ﬁeld of bodies, namely plants. Echoing the naturalist’s
delight that we ﬁrst saw in the case of Gerard and his garden, Milton’s poem is
replete with references to the seductions offered by Eden. From the beginning of
Book 4, in which Satan ﬁrst spots ‘delicious Paradise,’ to the many trials Eve faces
in relation to that ‘fair plant,’ the tree of knowledge, Milton suggests that the ﬁrst
seductions to lead ‘our grand parents’ astray came not from Satan, but from the
ﬁrst gardner and his plants: ‘Of God the garden was, by him in the east/Of Eden
planted.’ And like the ‘sovereign planter’ (4.690), Milton, too, delights in the
rhetorical excess afforded by Eden, weaving lavish descriptions of the garden’s
ﬂora into his own ﬂowering verse. Nowhere is this overlay of rhetoric and
botanical description more animate than around the ﬁgure of Eve, who, from the
very ﬁrst description, appears entangled with the garden: ‘Her unadorned golden
tresses wore/Dishevelled, but in wanton ringlets waved/As the vine curls her
tendrils’ (4.305–307). In the following passage, this hybridization of plant and
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human enters the realm of classical mythology, intersecting between Eve’s desire
and that of Ovid’s Narcissus:
I ﬁrst awaked, and found myself reposed
Under a shade of ﬂowers, much wondering where
And what I was, whence thither brought, and how.
Not distant far from thence a murmuring sound
Of waters issued from a cave and spread
Into a liquid plain, then stood unmoved
Pure as the expanse of heaven; I thither went
With unexperienced thought, and laid me down
On the green bank, to look into the clear
Smooth lake, that to me seemed another sky.
As I bent down to look, just opposite,
A shape within the watery gleam appeared
Bending to look on me, I started back,
It started back, but pleased I soon returned,
Pleased it returned as soon with answering looks
Of sympathy and love.
(4.450–465)
The scene of Eve’s awakening, which portrays her ensconced by ﬂowers and in
search of answers regarding ‘what,’ ‘whence’ and ‘how’ she came to be, unfurls
according to what would seem like a familiar story. In Ovid’s story of Narcissus
we recall the lovely boy looking in the pond and falling for his own image. Not
able to possess himself, Narcissus is driven by his frustration to the point
of despair and, with no way out of this circular fate, dies. After death he is
transformed into a ﬂower. While there is signiﬁcant diegetic overlap between the
two versions, Milton’s retelling of the Narcissus story has Eve less in a state of
despair and more in a state of awe over what appears at ﬁst as ‘A shape,’ an ‘It.’
Before discovering that the ‘shape within the watery gleam’ is in fact her shape,
Eve entertains the possibility of ‘sympathy and love’ between her and this ‘it.’ The
seduction between Eve and the ‘watery’ thing ﬂoating on the lake’s surface is
manifest in the dilatory repetitions of ‘Pleased’ and ‘returned,’ doubling in each
case the ‘I’ and the ‘it,’ and recreating in prose the ‘murmuring sound/Of waters’
that ﬁrst drew Eve to the lake. These audiovisual ‘murmurings’ signiﬁcantly alter
the status of Eve’s staring: for though the image is a reﬂection, Eve apprehends it
as a material composite of sound and light, a sonorous, ‘watery image.’ The effect
of this passage is to make Eve the female simulacra of the Narcissus ﬁgure, but the
delayed recognition of the ‘self’ in the water makes this a scene unlike that of the
Lacanian mirror stage, for in it there is not the presupposition of human
identiﬁcation but the more peculiar crossing of ‘it’ and ‘I’ (see Lacan, 2006).
Although the father’s ‘no’ (to put this in Lacanian terms) does impede Eve’s
looking: ‘Mine eyes till now, and pined with vain desire,/Had not a voice thus
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warned me, What thou seest,/What there thou seest fair creature is thyself’
(4.466–468); although God’s voice displaces Eve’s inhuman desire away from the
watery signiﬁer onto the human signiﬁed: ‘I will bring thee where no shadow
stays/Thy coming, and thy soft embraces, he/Whose image thou art’ (4.470–472);
nonetheless, Eve’s narcissism continues to blur forms of identiﬁcation across the
inhuman landscape: ‘I espied thee, fair indeed and tall, / Under a platan, yet
methought less fair,/Less winning soft, less amiably mild, / Than that smooth
watery image’ (4.477–480).
Parker, along with a host of other critics (Gregerson, 1995; Guillory, 1995),
reads Eve’s crucial moment of staring as the dilation of a choice between
temptation and Fall, and suggests that ‘Eve’s momentary staying upon her own
image becomes within the epic an emblem of all such suspensions’ (Parker, 1979,
116). But just as important, I argue, is the suspension of difference in the desire
for sameness that Eve’s narcissism enables.
Writing on the subject of narcissistic attachment, Bersani claims that ‘Every
theory of love is, necessarily, a theory of object relations’ (Bersani, 2008, 72).
I highlight this sentence in order to point to what is unthought – and what Milton,
by contrast, would have us consider – in its transitive description, namely, the
unthought role of the object. For the key question that psychoanalysis raises,
Bersani argues, is not how we choose objects to love, but, more fundamentally,
how we proceed to love an object at all. Bersani quotes Freud in asserting that
from its inception, psychoanalysis has been doubtful of that possibility: ‘“The
ﬁnding of an object,” Freud famously declared in the 1905 edition of the Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, “is in fact a re-ﬁnding of it.” Love, which we
like to think of as a discovery, is inseparable from memory’ (Bersani, 2008, 72).
Bersani adds to Freud’s claim that love is about ‘re-ﬁnding’ a lost object
(prototypically the mother’s breast) by asserting that ‘the resurrected object may
really be the loving subject, a self we lovingly recover at the very moment we may
wish to celebrate our openness to the world, that is, to an irresistibly seductive
otherness’ (Bersani, 2008, 72). The difﬁculty of loving an object, then, is that
we never know who or what the object is: whether it is the singular and unique
object, or the object of one’s past. It may even be oneself.
Signiﬁcantly, Bersani does not reject narcissism. Instead, following Foucault, he
asks whether there might be a way of ‘modeling an impersonal relational ﬁeld’
that uses narcissism as a resource, not an obstacle, for exploring different forms
of relationality. Bersani calls this relational ﬁeld ‘impersonal narcissism,’ and
through a reading of Plato’s The Symposium argues that ‘narcissistic love in both
the lover and the beloved … is exactly identical to a perfect knowledge of
otherness’ insofar as the ‘self the subject sees reﬂected in the other is not the
unique personality central to modern notions of individualism’ (Bersani, 2008, 85).
In the generous narcissism of the exchange between Socratic lovers, each
partner demands of the other … that he reﬂect the lover’s type of being, his
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universal singularity (and not his psychological particularities, his personal
difference), by recognizing and cultivating that singularity as his own most
pervasive, most pressing potentiality. If we were able to relate to others
according to this model of impersonal narcissism, what is different about
the other (their psychological individuality) could be thought of as merely
the envelope of the more profound (if less fully realized, or completed) part
of themselves which is our sameness.
(Bersani, 2008, 86)
Bersani’s important re-conceptualization of the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism is
in some sense a late heir to the Lucretian world view that Milton operated within. We
can see, for instance, the same stress on sameness and difference in Goldberg’s claim,
informed by his reading of Lucretius, that ‘from the point of view that prevails in early
modernity, there is no explanatory principle beyond the aleatory swerve, no god
behind the machine, indeed, no machine at all, since the fact that some things, once
they arise, are capable of replication is not the fundamental principle of how things
are’ (Goldberg, 2009, 2). How things are, more exactly, is a question of sameness and
difference, or of being differently composed of the same stuff, and of experiencing this
sameness as a matter of fullness rather than lack. As Goldberg continues, ‘differenceswithin-the same cannot be the basis for invidious and divisive difference or
foundational for juridical concepts of the normal’, (Goldberg, 2009, 2) Bersani’s
impersonal narcissism is one example of this Lucretian ethos.
Still, I would like to take this Lucretian narcissism one step further. Neither
Goldberg nor Bersani extend the theoretical architecture of Lucretius or Freud to
account for nonhuman entities. Milton, by contrast, forces us to consider what it
would mean for Eve to identify with an ‘it’ and to become, herself, a thing. In
Book 8 of Paradise Lost, the analogy to Narcissus becomes literalized as Eve,
more and more, identiﬁes with the garden:
… Eve
Perceiving where she sat retired in sight,
With lowliness majestic from her seat,
And grace that won who saw to wish her stay,
Rose, and went forth among her fruits and ﬂowers,
To visit how they prospered, bud and bloom,
Her nursery; they at her coming sprung
And touched by her fair tendance gladlier grew.
(8.40–47)
Here, the ‘delight’ of the garden is rendered mobile. Eve, going forth among ‘her
fruits and ﬂowers,’ not only occupies the poem’s central focus but also wins (won)
‘who saw to wish her stay’:
With goddess-like demeanor forth she went;
Not unattended, for on her as queen
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A pomp of winning graces waited still,
And from about her shot darts of desire
Into all eyes to wish her still in sight.
(8.59–63)
Eve commands the attention of all in her presence – Adam, Raphael, even ‘Her
nursery,’ which ‘at her coming sprung.’ At once the image of ‘lowliness,’ a woman
‘retired in sight,’ Eve commandeers the gaze of both Adam and Raphael, bringing
their ‘discourse’ to a halt and interrupting the ﬂow of the passage as the visual
register intercedes. Eve does not just appear within the ﬁeld of vision; she ‘Rose,’
and in doing so mirrors that line’s ﬁnal word, ‘ﬂowers.’ Eve becomes-ﬂower. This
form of mirroring takes Bersani’s theory of narcissism beyond its humanist conﬁnes
and grounds it in an involutionary becoming that links humans and plants. It also
foregrounds the active role of visual pleasure as Eve becomes the female object who,
as Laura Mulvey argues, both stills and sutures the male gaze through a constant
elicitation of visual pleasure and narcissistic desire (Mulvey, 1975).
Writing in her now classic essay, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,’
Mulvey asserts that what cinema offers us is visual pleasure matched to female
form. We sit in the darkness, peering at the cinema screen, watching while
beautiful women are stilled in sight. We are, consequently, all perverts at the
movies, Mulvey famously writes. And what is more, this pleasure is asymmetrical.
‘The paradox of phallocentrism in all its manifestations is that it depends on the
image of the castrated woman to give order and meaning to its world’ (Mulvey,
1975, 6). So powerful is this dependence that, when she is on screen, the female
image tends to stop the progress of narrative itself, suspending the action for the
male viewer’s erotic contemplation. Milton’s Eve does just that.
Beginning with the description of Eve as ‘lowliness majestic,’ Milton’s passage
exempliﬁes the paradoxical relation of the male viewer to the female object as
both image of attraction and image of arrest. Already in a relation of mirroring
rapport with the ‘ﬂowers’ in ‘her nursery,’ Eve’s image, both human and plant,
elicits the attention of Adam and Raphael by staying their visual pleasure as they,
in turn, ‘wish her stay.’ If Mulvey’s theory of visual pleasure puts the male viewer
in the position of active agent, Milton has Eve, the object of visual fascination, in
the position of master. As the poem unfolds, Eve moves from ‘lowliness’ to
‘majestic’ as she assumes ‘goddess-like demeanor’ and trafﬁcs in the scene’s
multiple, non-unilateral vectors of visual fascination. Oscillating between movement (‘With goddess-like demeanor forth she went’) and stasis (‘all eyes to wish
her still’), the scene works athwart Mulvey’s gender binary by envisioning the
female image as agent of arrest and the male viewer as thrall to pleasure. Active
and passive lose their gendered index. For if, in Milton’s hands, Eve is image, she
is not for that reason merely objectiﬁed by desire, ‘cut to the measure of desire,’ as
Mulvey insists (Mulvey, 1975, 17). Rather, Eve, the image of visual pleasure,
‘goddess-like,’ ﬂowers-forth through the scene like the goddess Venus, followed
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by a train of ‘graces,’ shooting ‘darts of desire/Into all eyes’ who ‘wish her still in
sight.’ Amidst Eve and her ﬂowers, a disequilibrium of furtive, ﬂorid forces courses
throughout, joining ﬂora and ﬂesh in a seductive, ecological assemblage.15
In the following passage, we see the force of this assemblage at work as Adam
recounts a highly affective encounter whereby he is ‘transported’ (‘transported I
behold’) by Eve’s ‘powerful glance.’ He describes this ‘glance’ in haptic terms as a
form of visual ‘touch’:
Thus I have told thee all my state, and brought
My story to the sum of earthly bliss
Which I enjoy, and must confess to ﬁnd
In all things else delight indeed, but such
As used or not, works in the mind no change,
Nor vehement desire, these delicacies
I mean of taste, sight, smell, herbs, fruits, and ﬂowers,
Walks, and the melody of birds; but here
Far otherwise, transported I behold,
Transported touch; here passion ﬁrst I felt,
Commotion strange, in all enjoyments else
Superior and unmoved, here only weak
Against the charm of beauty’s powerful glance.
(8.521–533)
Among the deﬁnitions current in Milton’s time, the Oxford English Dictionary
records that to be ‘transported’ meant ‘to cause to be beside oneself, to put into an
ecstasy, to enrapture.’ To say that Adam is beside himself, though, may be an
understatement. Having ‘told … all,’ and having ‘brought’ the reader’s mind to
‘the sum of earthly bliss,’ Adam ﬁnds still more he ‘must confess.’ His confession
produces what we might describe as an ecstatic dismembering of space and time,
sense and nonsense. Following an effusion of sensory modalities, ‘I mean of taste,
sight, smell, … and … melody,’ Adam is torn between ‘here’ (but where is ‘here’?)
and ‘far otherwise.’ ‘Here/… Far’: the collapse of immediacy and distance puts
Adam outside himself (from the Latin ek-stasis, to be put out of place). Adam is,
as it were, ‘transported’; he is carried away by ‘vehement desire.’ ‘But here/Far
otherwise, … I behold’: Whom does Adam behold? The meaning is (at least)
double: Adam beholds Eve, but he also beholds himself beholding. Adam sees
himself as the distance separating ‘here’ and ‘far,’ while at the same time his very
locution, ‘behold,’ collapses that distance by turning seeing into a form of touch.
Adam describes this encounter as ‘commotion strange.’ So ‘strange’ is this comotion of the seer and the seen that we can no longer be certain who is looking:
Who, after all, is the subject of ‘beauty’s powerful glance’? Adam or Eve?
Although Eve is the image of beauty, this ‘commotion strange’ blurs the
opposition between subject and object, such that Eve is at once the object, the
‘charm’ and the bearer of the ‘glance’ (and note that ‘glance’ already carries with
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15 My suggestion
that Eve’s
narcissism
threatens to
dissolve subject
and object into an
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assemblage of
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from critical
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try to redeem
Eve’s role from an
anti-feminist
tradition bent on
characterizing her
as a ﬁgure of
wantonness and
seduction (see, for
example,
McColley (1983,
4). My reading
instead explores
the seductive
possibilities for
human and
nonhuman
assemblage
opened up by
Eve’s narcissistic
entanglements. In
Milton’s
ecological vision,
seduction and
perversion are
integral to the
Garden; queering
‘human’ relations
is what gardens
do.

Vol. 7, 1, 120–146

139

Swarbrick

it the non-visual meaning of touch, as in a weapon or an object struck) – whereas
Adam, after repeating his sense of (dis)location, ‘here only,’ conveys feeling
‘weak’ before Eve, ‘transported’ by her ‘glance.’ Touched, weakened, transported
by desire, Adam dissolves before Eve into an ecstatic assemblage of affects and
pleasures. ‘All higher knowledge in her presence falls’ (8.551).
The image of Eve as ‘beauty’s glance’ returns us to the impersonal narcissistic
realm of becoming in which subject and object lose their ﬁxed distinctions.
Eve’s image, an assemblage of human and plant, leaves Adam ‘weak’:
‘Not proof enough such object to sustain’ (8.535). But this weakening also
exposes Adam to an altered sensory experience in which ‘taste, sight, smell’
and ‘touch’ mutually enfold subject and object in a ‘strange’ affective realm.
This type of enfolding grounds Milton’s poetic ecology in what Elaine Scarry
refers to as the ‘cross-species desire’ that links humans and plants (Scarry,
2001, 65). It also foregrounds the active role of material life in Milton’s poem,
thus going against Fish’s desire to replace materiality with ‘pure’ theology.
More importantly, it calls to mind the utter strangeness of plant life – and life
in general – in Milton’s poetry.

P l a nt S e d u c ti on a nd E c o l o gy t o C o m e

16 For an account of
how early modern
natural history
developed a
‘science of
describing’ that
took the
description of
nature as an end
in itself, thus
rejecting the
medical rationale
of earlier
naturalists, as
well as the
economic
rationale of later
ones, see Ogilvie
(2006).

140

In Cultivating Delight, subtitled A Natural History of My Garden, Ackerman
begins with the following observation: ‘I plan my garden as I wish I could plan my
life, with islands of surprise, color, and scent’ (Ackerman, 2002, 1). For Gerard,
as for the naturalists of his time, the cultivation of delight was a practice that
veered unimpeachably upon the strange and unpredictable nature of their life’s
work: the careful and painstaking task of cultivating, preserving and describing
plants.16 What is more, gardens were, as Ackerman points out, a means of
controlling life. Preﬁguring what Foucault later termed the biopolitics of modern
life, whereby each life is cultivated to procure more life, and in which life itself
becomes – as Agamben notes (Agamben, 2004, 15) – a kind of vegetable existence
suspended between life and death, nature’s body entered into the biopolitics of
control largely through the local and global transfer of plants between Europe
and its colonies in the early modern period (Schiebinger and Swan, 2005).
Contemporary scholars Schiebinger (2004) and Parrish (2006), writing from the
intersections of historiography, postcoloniality and the history of science,
note that plants, though integral to how bodies of knowledge have been formed
and reformed throughout human history, continue to be regarded as supernumerary agents in the affairs of human societies. ‘Plants seldom ﬁgure in the
grand narratives of war, peace, or even everyday life in proportion to their
importance to humans,’ Schiebinger writes, ‘yet they are signiﬁcant natural
and cultural artifacts, often at the center of high intrigue’ (Schiebinger, 2004, 3).
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To paraphrase Schiebinger’s argument, plants have been a consistent leitmotif
throughout human history, a central yet invisible theme, so apparent as to be
inapparent to the economic, political and cultural inquiries of historians and
literary critics alike. This blindsight notwithstanding, as historical artifacts, plants
have provided for a wide range of human desires, and at great cost, serving
variously as sweeteners, spices, pharmacological curatives, narcotics [abortifacients and laxatives, to name just a few of their many uses, while being
aggressively] appropriated and sold (‘thingiﬁed,’ to use Aimé Césaire’s word
[see Césaire, 2000, 42]) as what Schiebinger (quoting a student of Carl Linnaeus)
calls ‘the base for all economics,’ both in the early modern period and after.
Still, there is something else in Gerard’s exaltation of plants that, while
common enough among the annals of Renaissance botany, now seems strikingly
discordant with our own practices of looking and perceiving plants. I want to
venture that what is most striking about Gerard’s assessment of plants goes
beyond his consideration of their uses. French botanist Hallé claims that ‘plants
to us are principally food, drink, medicine, raw material for industry, pasturage
for domestic animals, green space for cities, landscapes for relaxation’; rarely do
they ‘arouse any real passion in most of us’ (Hallé, 2002, 25). Gerard, by
contrast, precipitates a sense of the agency of plants, hinting not only at their
capacity to be moved (bought, sold, consumed) but to move, and thereby
to seduce.
Gerard’s text illustrates that plants not only have the capacity to move, but they
move us as well. Plants seduce: from the Latin seducere, meaning to lead, to
persuade. Though we are used to thinking of plants as passive beings lacking in
movement and sense, arguably the two attributes most often chosen – reason
notwithstanding – to set plant life apart from the existential affairs of humans,
for Gerard, not only do plants move, their movements are an invitation to
refocus our attention on the ways that humans can end up acting as prosthetics
for other things in the world, in this case plants. This, we might say, is what
constitutes the uncanny sentience of plants: their ability to invite, to teach and
no doubt to seduce. Ackerman reminds us that although ‘when we describe
ourselves as “sentient” beings we mean that we are conscious,’ thoughtful,
intentional beings (in Latin, sent means ‘to head for,’ hence, to go out or to
intend mentally), ‘the more literal and encompassing meaning is that we have
sense perception’ (sentir, ‘to feel’) (Ackerman, 1990, xvii). Ackerman’s more
literal, more lowly deﬁnition of intelligence offers critical insight for those
interested in countering the human exceptionalist tendency of reducing the
greater ecology of mind to a rather limited, philosophically and biologically
speaking, datum of sense.
Seen in this context, Milton’s way of looking at plants is less straightforwardly epistemological or pragmatic; it is, rather, pharmacological in
Derrida’s sense of pharmakon: it infects the viewer by crossing the traditional boundary between objective contemplation and affective response
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17 On the
applicability
of Derrida’s
deﬁnition of
pharmakon to
ecological
practice, see
Stengers (2010,
28–41).

18 See Morton (2010,
41), who
translates the
irreducible
otherness of
Derrida’s arrivant
as ‘strange
stranger.’
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(Derrida, 1981).17 Indeed, it exempliﬁes Deleuze and Guattari’s language of
worlding. As they put it, ‘We are not in the world’ as thinkers absolved from
life’s forces, but rather, ‘we become with the world; we become by contemplating it’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 169). Foucault describes this way of
looking as an act of curiosity. Despite its negative valuation within the orders
of objective knowledge, Foucault sees curiosity, along with its related affects of
interest, excitement, surprise and wonder, as essential goads to inquiry. In this
respect, Foucault can be placed in an uncanny alliance – stretching across the
premodern–modern divide – with the purveyors of Renaissance natural
history, who saw, as Daston and Park have argued, ‘objective order and
subjective sensibility’ as ‘obverse and reverse of the same coin’ (Daston and
Park, 2001, 14). According to Daston and Park, early modern naturalists
organized their science of looking around the affects of wonder, curiosity and
delight, which were ‘as much about knowing as about feeling.’ For these early
modern scientists, ‘To register wonder was to register a breached boundary, a
classiﬁcation subverted. The making and breaking of categories – sacred and
profane; natural and artiﬁcial, animal, vegetable and mineral; sublunar and
celestial – is the Ur-act of cognition, underpinning all pursuit of regularities
and discovery of causes’ (Daston and Park, 2001, 14). Indeed, it was René
Descartes who called wonder the ﬁrst of the passions, ‘a sudden surprise of the
soul which makes it tend to consider attentively those objects which seem to it
rare and extraordinary’ (quoted in Daston and Park, 2001, 13). To read
Foucault next to Descartes is to risk more than anachronism. It is to suggest
something monstrous. Yet from the perspective I have tried to map out here, a
perspective based on the aesthetics of scientiﬁc or ecological perception, the
distance between the two is not at all far. They are simply ‘obverse and reverse’
of the same coin. As Foucault himself says, curiosity, read etymologically as
‘care,’ calls for a different way of looking. It ‘evokes the care one takes of what
exists and what might exist; … a certain determination to throw off familiar
ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way; … a lack of
respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental’
(Foucault, 1997a, 325). An aesthetics without criteria, then (see Shaviro, 2009).
Milton conjures the sense of an ahierarchal aesthetics based on a belief that all
beings, be they ‘less or more, or soon or slow,’ partake of the ‘All is.’ To take steps to
the ‘All is’ is, for Milton, an ecological and thus material endeavor. It does not come
from beyond. Nor does it grow from the earth. It is a work. But what Milton’s
georgics of the mind essays (that is, puts to the test) more precisely is the unwork, the
practices of askesis, whereby a community or cosmopolity of ‘strange strangers’18
may take shape in the very fault lines of instrumental labor. To quote Gregory
Bateson, this ecological way of thinking that outstrips human agency ‘does not
yet exist as an organized body of theory or knowledge’ (Bateson, 2000, xxiii); it is
not yet a commodity or a convention; happily, it is to come. Milton urges its
coming.
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